Some FAQs based on https://x.com/saxenism/status/2002311606752215253
- Do you assume auditor-operator separation? If an operator can also register as an auditor, how do you prevent self-auditing or “friendly auditor” capture?
We assume an auditor set with >=2/3 honesty assumption. This is reasonable once the auditor set is large, but bootstrapping is hard and smaller sets are easier to capture. For each enclave, auditors are selected as a subcommittee from the larger auditor set, which gives a much higher level probability of honest members (inspired by Eth2 committees). With a dishonest majority, auditors can slash someone else, they cannot prove an enclave is up while it isn’t.
- What’s the Sybil resistance model for auditors? What stops an attacker from spinning many auditor identities to bias assignments or local majorities?
Auditors must stake to register which is slashed if reports are incorrect. An attacker can sybil, but unless they control >1/3 of the auditor set then they can’t practically influence the subcommittee for an enclave. For a sufficiently large auditor set, acquiring that much stake is very hard.
(One potential attack scenario is “auditors for hire”, where auditors behave honestly most of the time but collude on specific jobs to slash an enclave(possibly to drive specific operators out of competition). We are exploring subcommittee selection designs where proving committee membership is impossible, forcing attackers to bribe the entire auditor set which significantly increases attack cost.)
- For incorrect audit bits, delayed reveal makes challenges possible once R_{T_i} is posted. But for “offline” reports, does the chain get a cryptographic proof that the audit request was delivered and the response arrived? Absence claims are asymmetric. If an auditor says “no response”, what evidence exists either way? Have you considered receipt-style proofs (enclave-signed challenge response or transcript hash) so “I responded” is provable on-chain?
If an auditor reports “no response”, we can’t reliably distinguish whether the enclave never received the request or the auditor never sent it. So afaik, receipt style proofs might not help if the auditor is malicious. Instead, we rely on auditor randomness and honesty of subcommittee instead. Also “no response” is not rewarded, rewards are only given for proving availability, so auditor has incentives to not withhold and prove the availability.
- The host/provider controls scheduling and networking. Even with encrypted payloads, they can shape traffic and selectively drop. How do you model:
- healthy-to-auditors but degraded-to-users
- blocked auditor traffic but normal user traffic
- or the inverse (users blocked, auditors allowed)
This is an open problem. Hosts can selectively allow traffic and this is a problem as you said.
Possible mitigations include traffic obfuscation using shared proxies or convergence of auditor and user access paths, but this remains an open design question. Happy to hear any ideas here.
- Do you rely on audit traffic being indistinguishable from user traffic? In practice, hosts can still use metadata, routing and timing.
Yes, this is an assumption right now but a weak one. Removing this assumption is important and ties into the mitigations mentioned above.
- Monitoring is periodic (per Age/slot). Does that create “between-check” windows for strategic micro-downtime, censorship, or MEV-timed unavailability? Do you randomize challenges to reduce predictability?
Checks are randomised in time(with age/slot), so it is hard to identify auditors purely based on timing. Operator risks slashing with any micro downtime or censorship.
- What happens if the instance crashes near epoch end and cannot reveal R_{T_i}? Is there a commitment/receipt mechanism earlier in the epoch that avoids ambiguous states?
If the instance can’t reveal R_{T_i} due to a crash, the provider is considered at fault and can be slashed since availability is part of guarantees they provide. We also separate the base platform tooling from application code via blue images that enable docker based workflows, so an application crashing shouldn’t take down the entire enclave.
- Slashing prices unavailability, but does not prevent it if the payoff is higher than the penalty. How do you think about strategic unavailability where the attacker’s profit dominates slashing?
Yup, it won’t. As I was mentioning in 2, we are looking to increase the cost to attack so that it is very hard for an enclave operator to be incorrectly slashed.
- This protocol seems great for detection and penalties, but what’s the story for safe recovery when downtime happens anyway? In privacy/TEE-heavy systems, graceful fallback often means leaking what you were protecting. How do you handle continuity without unsafe fail-open paths?
This protocol isn’t intended to replace application design for fault tolerance. It provides economic accountability and pressure to improve reliability, but applications should still assume enclaves can fail and design accordingly.
- Beyond incentives, do you enforce redundancy requirements or recommend operational patterns (replicas, failover, multi-provider) to reduce correlated downtime?
We strongly recommend designing applications for enclave crashes and downtime. Replication and redundancy are important design patterns here.